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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4374 
_____________ 
 
COLEMAN R. MCCALL, 
                                              Appellant  
 
 v. 
 
 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA  
DIVISION OF AVIATION;  
 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
DIVISION OF AVIATION;  
 PHILADELPHIA AIRPORT SYSTEM; PHILADELPHIA 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT  
  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-11-cv-05689 
District Judge: The Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
                               
Argued October 6, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 18, 2015)              
 
Lorrie McKinley  [ARGUED] 
McKinley & Ryan 
238 West Miner Street 
West Chester, PA  19382 
 Counsel for Appellant 
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Elise M. Bruhl  [ARGUED] 
City of Philadelphia 
Law Department 
1515 Arch Street 
One Parkway  
Philadelphia, PA  19102 
 Counsel for Appellees 
              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
 
                                                   
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Coleman R. McCall was a Custodial Worker I at the Philadelphia 
International Airport, which is administered by the City of Philadelphia.  McCall 
began his employment in April of 2001.  Ten years later, McCall’s employment 
was terminated.  Thereafter, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that the City had violated his 
rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Con. Stat. § 955.   
 3 
 
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment after discovery 
closed.  The District Court denied summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation 
claim, but granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the ADA and PHRA 
claims.  After the FMLA claim settled, McCall filed this appeal.  He challenges 
only the grant of summary judgment on the ADA claims alleging: (1) a failure to 
accommodate McCall’s knee disability; (2) a failure to accommodate McCall’s 
depressive disorder; and (3) a hostile work environment.1  
 “An employer commits unlawful disability discrimination under the ADA if 
[it] ‘does not mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations’” of an employee.  Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 
325 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  “‘[W]hile the notice [of a desire for an 
accommodation] does not have to be in writing, be made by the employee, or 
formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation,’ the notice 
nonetheless must make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her 
disability.’”  Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
 In this case, McCall contends the City failed to accommodate his knee 
                                                   
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct plenary review of a District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 
405 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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disability when it did not allow him to use the fifteen days of unpaid leave 
available to employees at the City’s discretion under a civil service regulation.  
There is no evidence that McCall ever requested such an accommodation.  Indeed, 
in his deposition he affirmed that did not need to make such a request because the 
fifteen days of unpaid leave were given to every employee.  McCall’s reliance on 
the availability of unpaid leave, however, was misplaced.  McCall’s placement on 
the No Unpaid Leave List in both 2006 and 2009, as well as the City’s issuance of 
notice in August of 2009 that it would not be as generous in approving unpaid 
leave, unmistakably informed McCall that unpaid leave was not automatically 
available to every employee every year.  
 Nor is there evidence from which constructive notice of a desire for an 
accommodation could be inferred.  It is true that McCall had several unauthorized 
absences.  Those absences, however, cannot provide the requisite notice as there 
was no documentation which would inform the City that McCall’s unauthorized 
absences were attributable to his knee disorder.  We recognize that Dr. Leavitt’s 
letter explained that McCall’s unauthorized absence on May 1, 2010 was due to 
severe knee pain and depression.  But that letter, dated March 21, 2013, cannot 
constitute constructive notice triggering the duty to accommodate McCall’s knee 
disability because the letter was written almost three years after the unauthorized 
absence on May 1, 2010. 
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 As to McCall’s depressive disorder, the evidence fails to establish that the 
City even knew of McCall’s depression until he asked for FMLA leave at the end 
of July 2010.  Once the City was informed of McCall’s depressive disorder, 
however, it granted both the requested leave and an extension of that leave.  
Thereafter, McCall submitted a prescription from his physician stating that his “job 
related problem continues unimproved.  He is unable to work through April 4, 
2011.”  The City did not deny additional leave.  Rather, the City informed McCall 
that it could not process the request “because the condition for which you are being 
treated . . . is not listed on your doctor’s note and you did not complete and submit 
a leave request.”  McCall promised several times to provide the necessary medical 
documentation.  But by April 5, 2011, McCall had failed to submit any 
documentation.  We conclude that the District Court appropriately granted 
summary judgment on this claim because the City lacked not only a request for 
leave, but also the information necessary to determine what kind of 
accommodation was desired.  
 Nor are we persuaded that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on McCall’s hostile environment claim.  A successful ADA hostile 
environment claim requires that the “harassment was based on [the] disability or a 
request for an accommodation.”  Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 
F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999).  The evidence fails to show that any harassment that 
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occurred was related to either McCall’s knee disorder or his depression.   
 We recognize that a request for FMLA leave may qualify in certain 
circumstances as a request for an accommodation under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.702(c)(2).  Nonetheless, any harassment McCall may have endured because 
of a request for FMLA leave occurred when his twins were born prematurely.  This 
was family leave under the FMLA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)((1)(A)-(C).  Because 
family leave is not based on an employee’s own serious health condition, a request 
for family leave under the FMLA cannot qualify as a request for accommodation 
of a disability in an ADA hostile environment claim.   
 To be sure, there was some hostility at work.  Kayla Jones, the management 
employee in charge of applying the City’s progressive discipline policy, was 
unprofessional in her interaction with employees, including McCall.  The Inspector 
General’s Office recommended that Jones “be disciplined for multiple incidents of 
conduct unbecoming in order to minimize further occurrences.”  Yet Jones’s 
inability to behave professionally with multiple individuals does not establish that 
any harassment by Jones was because of McCall’s disabilities or a request for an 
accommodation.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
